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Regional Parliaments in the EU Multilevel Parliamentary System 
European integration has created a multilevel political system that is dominated by 
executive actors. Despite the increasing competences of the European Parliament, a 
growing EU-awareness of national assemblies and an emerging attention of regional 
parliaments for EU affairs, the EU polity still lacks a sound parliamentary 
representation. As the EU presents itself as a representative democracy, the current set-
up raises questions from the perspective of democratic legitimacy. The establishment of 
multilevel parliamentarianism may be part of the remedy. This introduction focuses on 
the position that regional parliaments take in such a European multilevel parliamentary 
system. We address three relevant questions: what roles do regional parliaments take up 
in terms of legislation, scrutiny and networking; to what extent are they empowered by 
the Lisbon Treaty and what explains the variation in their activities. We develop 
hypotheses that are to varying degree addressed by the contributions in this special 
issue. 
Keywords: European Union, multilevel governance, parliaments, regions, democratic 
deficit 
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Introduction 
The European Communities originally started with a set of institutions and a power balance that 
were both heavily tilted in favour of executives. As the powers of the EU expanded over time, 
the democratic and legitimate nature of its decision-making raised increasing concern. This led 
to the strengthening of the European Parliament, but also to the growing recognition of sub-
national levels of government, and thus to the gradual emergence of an EU system of multi-
level governance. But do more levels of government automatically lead to more democracy? 
 Even today, EU multi-level law- and policy-making relies heavily on European and 
national level executives: overall policy guidance is set by the heads of state and government 
of the member states in the European Council, specific proposals are developed by the European 
Commission, and the stronger one of the two European legislators – the Council of Ministers – 
is composed of national (and occasionally sub-national) ministers. In addition, a growing 
number of agencies and institutions, such as the European Central Bank, are granted substantial 
autonomous decision-making powers while legislation is increasingly replaced by executive 
measures (such as delegated acts) and soft coordination instruments (e.g. within the Europe 
2020 agenda) in which executive institutions are dominant actors. However, if one accepts that 
parliamentarisation is an important part of the response to the European democratic deficit 
(Follesdal & Hix, 2006), and that Europe does not have one unified demos, but multiple 
national/regional demos (Nicolaïdis, 2013; Cheneval & Schimmelfenning, 2013), then national 
- and in at least eight member states also regional - parliaments come into the picture (Weiler, 
2012).  
 The question of how national parliaments cope with European integration has received 
growing attention in recent years. Scholars have analysed national parliaments’ activities, 
institutional strength, institutional adaptation, resources and performance (for recent 
contributions, see e.g. Cooper, 2012; Raunio, 2011; Winzen, 2012; Hefftler et al., 2015, Auel 
& Christiansen, 2015; Bellamy & Kröger, 2016; Sprungk, 2016). By contrast, academics have 
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largely ignored the topic of regional parliaments, except for single country-studies (Abels, 
2013, Carter & McLeod, 2005) and some pioneering comparative work (Boronska-
Hryniewiecka, 2013b; Abels & Eppler, 2015). These studies almost exclusively deal with the 
aggregate level, with Schneider et al. (2014) as a notable exception. The limited attention for 
regional parliaments may seem surprising considering the extensive attention for regional 
governments, and especially since eight member states contain regional parliaments with 
legislative powers (Germany, Austria, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Portugal and 
Finland). One can think of several reasons for this lack of attention. First, comparative research 
into regional parliaments is challenging, as it requires detailed knowledge not only of the 
European and national, but also of the regional contexts (Ladrech, 2015). In addition, regional 
parliaments have only been recognized as formal participants in EU policy-making since the 
Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Finally, regional assemblies vary substantially regarding the level of 
EU competencies, which makes comparative research rather demanding.  
 Nevertheless, the Treaty of Lisbon has acted as a wake-up call for regional parliaments 
as it triggered various institutional and procedural reforms designed to improve the scrutiny of 
EU affairs at the sub-national level. The aim of this volume is therefore to examine the role 
regional parliaments take up in the EU policy-making arena. This includes an examination of 
the functions they fulfil, and hence the activities they deploy, in EU policy-making, their 
empowerment in the wake of the Lisbon Treaty and the factors that can explain variation in 
activities and power. From the scarce literature so far, we already know that regional 
parliaments’ activities and power vary a lot. The articles in this volume will add more detailed 
and systematic empirical knowledge to this. To frame these contributions, the introduction first 
reviews the ways in which regional parliaments are important for a democratic EU, next it 
discusses the channels of participation and influence in EU politics that are available for 
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regional parliaments, and finally, it outlines the three key questions that will be investigated in 
this special issue. 
A Role for Sub-national Parliaments in EU Democracy? 
The nature of democracy in the EU is a much debated topic among EU scholars. Different views 
are rooted in different conceptualisations of the EU. We agree with those who argue that the 
EU has moved beyond a mere international organization or regulatory agency controlled by its 
member states (cf. Follesdal & Hix, 2006) and that it also contains supranational (if not federal) 
characteristics. We thus see the EU as a proper political system, composed of multiple layers. 
Both its functioning and legitimation are therefore multilevel as well. One way to legitimise a 
polity is through representation. Crum and Fossum (2009) argue convincingly that especially 
parliamentary representation is the most suitable way of ensuring political equality and public 
deliberation, which are crucial criteria for democratic legitimacy (see also Bellamy & Kröger, 
2012a). Moreover, the EU treaty itself (Art. 10(2) TEU) defines the EU as a representative 
democracy (Bellamy & Kröger, 2012b) which thus raises expectations regarding the role of 
parliaments in the EU. 
 Yet, it is exactly in the area of parliamentary representation that arguably the most 
important democratic shortcoming of the EU is to be found. Even after the implementation of 
the Lisbon Treaty, the EP is still deprived of legislative powers in several domains that belong 
at least partially to EU competences and, of course, the EP still lacks the right to initiate 
legislation (Corbett et al., 2016).In addition, several authors contend that parliamentarisation at 
the EU level alone is not sufficient and that at least part of the solution is therefore (also) situated 
at the level of the member states (cf. Maurer, 2002). Thus, Weiler (2012)argues that the EU 
will ultimately need to base its legitimacy on national democratic institutions, including 
national parliaments while Cooper (2012; 2013) uses the concept of virtual third chamber or 
even tricameralism to call for the activation of national parliaments. Likewise, Puntscher et al. 
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(2013) add the national level (‘representation of the parts’) to the EU level (‘representation of 
the whole’) when it comes to parliamentary representation.  
 Nevertheless, domestic parliaments struggle in the European multi-level context. 
Bellamy and Kröger(2012a; 2012b)argue that national parliaments are limited in their capacity 
to serve the representative role. National parliaments and national parties are left with less 
policy space as competencies have been transferred to the European level. They also have a 
decreasing policy repertoire at their disposal due to the single market dominance at the EU 
level, while supremacy and direct effect of EU laws combined with an activist Court of Justice 
increasingly limit the national parliaments’ and parties’ discretion. All this results in a 
decreasing capacity to offer voters alternative policy options. In addition, national parliaments 
often lack ex ante scrutiny of national governments’ the bargaining positions in EU policies as 
they suffer from informational asymmetries. Moreover, the increasing use of mechanisms such 
as the open method of coordination (OMC) exclude national parliaments from participation in 
much of EU policy-making. 
 The reaction of national parliaments has been to enhance their institutional capacity to 
seek more EU related information, and to increase scrutiny of EU policies (e.g. through 
establishing European Affairs committees and by activating the Early Warning System). Hence, 
despite the shortcomings of national parliaments, what is put in place in the EU context can be 
considered as an emerging multilevel parliamentary system, which comes down to a balancing 
act between direct representation of citizens (through the European Parliament) and indirect 
representation of its constitutive units (Warleigh, 2003). This perspective has been taken by 
Hurrelmann (2007), by Lord and Pollak (2010),who have coined the term of compound 
representation, and by Crum and Fossum (Crum & Fossum 2009; 2012, Crum 2015), who have 
proposed the notion of the Multilevel Parliamentary Field in this respect. 
7                                                                    THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES


 There is still an element missing, however, as all these approaches hardly ever include 
the role that regional parliaments can play in the EU multilevel parliamentary system. This is 
remarkable as a growing number of EU member states is confronted with an evolution towards 
internal multilevel governance, be it federal states (Germany, Austria, Belgium), quasi-federal 
or devolved states (Italy, Spain, the UK) or asymmetrically decentralized states (Portugal and 
Finland). The regional constitutive entities of these member states have directly elected 
legislatives, which enjoy varying but often substantial competencies in a large set of EU 
policies(Cloots et al., 2012), making these regional parliaments also largely responsible for the 
implementation of EU directives (Treib, 2014).For the same member states, a multilevel 
parliamentary system also comprises the regional legislatives. Here, we disagree with Crum 
(2015) who argues that national democracy is qualitatively different form sub-national or 
European democracy only allowing for institutional and sociological exceptions (e.g. UK, 
Belgium, Spain). On the contrary, our analysis does include long-standing federations like 
Germany or Austria should be included as in both countries, the constitutions foresee that all 
competences are by default regional competences, unless the constitution states otherwise (Art. 
15(1) B-VG, 25. July 2012; art. 30 GG, 23.12.2014).  
In short, despite their relevant position in the EU polity, regional parliaments have hardly been 
discussed in scholarly work on representation as part of democratic legitimacy. For instance, 
neither the recent 2013 Journal of European Integration special issue on representation in the 
EU, nor the 2015 West European Politics or the 2016 Comparative European Politics special 
issues on parliaments in the EU pay attention to regional parliaments. It is the aim of this 
contribution to expand the research agenda by incorporating the regional parliamentary level in 
the analysis of multilevel parliamentarianism in the EU. 
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Regional Parliaments in EU Affairs 
The following guiding research question is raised: What roles do regional parliaments take up 
in EU policy-making? To answer this, we depart from the different functions that national 
parliaments can assume in the EU. According to Sprungk (2013) national parliaments take up 
new roles in the multilevel environment that has been established by European integration. She 
mentions gate keeping, scrutinizing and networking functions. The first refers to the Early 
Warning System (EWS) which enables national parliaments to make the European Commission 
reconsider proposing legislative acts when these are considered breaching the subsidiarity or 
proportionality principles. The scrutinizing role points to the classic control function of 
parliaments, while the networking role points to the horizontal and vertical relations between 
parliaments. Regional parliaments are equally involved in the EWS, either through the second 
chamber or by themselves, they have the possibility to control regional executives when the 
latter take part in national EU policy coordination, and they are part of the broader network of 
legislatives. Hence, what Sprungk describes for national parliaments also accounts for regional 
assemblies, be it to varying degrees depending on their position in the constitutional framework. 
  
 A similar list of functions is presented by Abels (2013) who distinguishes between two 
types of functions. Type 1 consists of legislative, control, budget and elective functions. Abels 
stresses that the first three are heavily affected by European integration: national parliaments 
need to accommodate the traditional way of law-making and scrutinizing to the European 
multilevel context: their role shifts from initiating new legislation towards implementing EU 
legislation and from scrutinizing national executive measures to controlling national 
executives’ behaviour at the EU level. Again, depending on the domestic constellations, 
regional parliaments to varying degrees have become responsible for implementation of EU 
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laws and for scrutinizing EU policy coordination. Abels’ type 2 encompasses communication 
and networking, the latter coinciding with Sprungk’s third dimension, and hence applicable to 
both the national and the regional levels. Control and networking are also the two dimensions 
in Högenauer’s (2015) analysis of the Scottish Parliament. She argues that domestic parliaments 
should adapt and enhance participation and scrutiny of national EU policy-making and should 
invest in interparliamentary relations within the EU multilevel parliamentary system. In the 
following we take the encompassing concept of parliamentary scrutiny to list the opportunities 
regional parliaments have, to get involved in EU policy-making in terms of legislative gate 
keeping, scrutinizing and networking. 
 In practice, regional parliaments have three major ways of participating in EU policy-
making: they can try to influence the policy-making activities of EU institutions (legislative 
function), attempt to control how their national and regional governments act in EU policy-
making (scrutiny function) and seek to network with other legislative or executive actors in the 
multilevel environment. The networking function is a hybrid one that can be used to support 
the other two functions. For example, parliaments can build coalitions with other actors to 
improve their ability to influence legislation (legislative function) or to gather information that 
they can use to control their executives (scrutiny function). 
 On the European level, regional parliaments have two options. Firstly, a limited 
number of representatives of regional parliaments sit on the Committee of the Regions (CoR). 
The CoR is an advisory committee in EU policy-making that has to be consulted on a wide 
range of issues and that has the right to adopt opinions on its own initiative in the remaining 
policy areas. Under the Treaty of Lisbon, it furthermore gained the right to bring cases for 
annulment of laws on grounds of subsidiarity before the Court of Justice. However, in May 
2013 only about 10 percent of the members of the Committee of the Regions represented 
regional parliaments with legislative powers (Högenauer et al., 2016), and at the time of 
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writing(2016) that number was at 7 percent. The rest represent local councils, regional 
executives etc., which means that even in the CoR parliamentary concerns only play a marginal 
role.  
 Secondly, the Treaty of Lisbon allows regional parliaments to participate in the new 
EWS, albeit only in collaboration with their national parliament. The EWS – defined in the 
Protocol on Subsidiarity and Proportionality – allows each national parliament to review EU 
legislative proposals for conformity with the principle of subsidiarity within an eight-week 
period after publication. Each national parliament has two votes and, in the case of most 
bicameral parliaments, each chamber has one vote. This means that regional parliaments have 
a direct or indirect role to play in the EWS. If domestic parliaments amounting to more than 
one third of all votes adopt “reasoned opinions” detecting a breach of subsidiarity, the European 
Commission must review its proposal.  
 While this new opportunity has triggered much interest among national parliaments and 
several reforms in regional parliaments (Vara Arribas & Högenauer, 2015), its importance 
should not be overstated. The level of influence that regional parliaments can wield under the 
EWS is limited by its features.  Firstly, domestic parliaments cannot force European institutions 
to withdraw a proposal or even just to amend it. Secondly, the tight deadline of eight weeks 
makes it difficult for national parliaments to adopt a reasoned opinion. For regional parliaments, 
this period is even shorter, as they must give the national parliament time to process its opinion. 
Next, the focus of the EWS is rather narrow: Technically all objections have to be couched in 
terms of subsidiarity. In addition, the threshold for votes is relatively high (so far, the required 
number of votes has only been reached in two cases).Finally, national parliaments are only 
rarely obliged to take the views of regional parliaments into account (Crum, 2015): The 
Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality leaves the 
consultation of regional parliaments to the discretion of national parliaments. As Vara Arribas 
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(2015) points out, some parliaments like the British or Spanish only mention regional opinions, 
if they themselves also adopt a reasoned opinion. Otherwise, regional parliamentary opinions 
are not necessarily passed on to the EU institutions. 
 Overall, regional parliaments thus only benefit from a limited range of options if they 
wish to influence legislative proposals of the European Commission. With respect to other than 
legislative policy measures that equally affect regional competencies no formal participation of 
regional parliaments at all is envisaged by the EU legal framework. This is a remarkable 
observation given the relevance of for instance the Europe 2020 agenda in the areas of social, 
economic and environmental policies, which often belong to regional policy portfolios.  
 The other option for regional parliaments is to focus on controlling the position of the 
regional executive within the domestic EU policy coordination. In those countries that have 
regional parliaments with legislative powers, the regional executives would normally either can 
attend meetings at different levels in the Council of Ministers, or they would at least be 
consulted during the coordination stage of member state positions. However, regional 
governments benefit from two advantages over regional parliaments in this respect. Firstly, they 
have an information advantage, as they attend European negotiations or national coordination 
meetings, whereas parliaments have to rely on minutes or reports. Secondly, regional 
governments benefit from the fact that the complex negotiation and coordination systems allow 
them to disguise to some extent their precise position, what exactly they agreed to give up in 
return for what other concession and how quickly they were willing to give in. Thus, in the 
same way in which national governments can blame other member states or “Europe” for 
unpopular decisions, regional governments can blame “Europe”, other member states and the 
national government and potentially even other regional governments.  
 Nevertheless, it is worth noting that regional parliaments have a range of options at their 
disposal to control regional governments in EU affairs: they can request information and 
REGIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EU MULTILEVEL PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM   


explanation via parliamentary questions, they can organize debates on controversial issues and 
they can ask the regional government to report on salient issues in parliament. Increasingly, 
regional parliaments are trying to receive reports, not only after meetings of the Council of 
Ministers (e.g. the Belgian Regions), but also before such meetings take place (e.g. the German 
Länder). As part of such meetings, certain regions are starting to develop strategies for 
mandating, i.e. for imposing their view on the government and for controlling after Council 
meetings how their views were represented (Abels, 2015). 
 Next to the parliament - executive relations within the regional level, regional 
parliaments can also become involved in controlling national executives. They can engage in 
scrutiny of national EU policies, formally through second chambers of national parliaments or 
joint committees, or informally through party links. And if they do so, regional assemblies can 
act individually (bilaterally) or collectively (multilaterally). Furthermore, the object of their 
scrutiny activities can be regional EU policy or national EU policy, but also the (domestic) 
intergovernmental relations through which EU policies are established (Hazell 2010). 
 Finally, a third (and more informal) way to take part in EU policy-making is to network 
with other regional parliaments and/or regional governments to gain strength through 
numbers. The Subsidiarity Monitoring Network of the Committee of the Regions or CALRE – 
the Conference of European Regional Legislative Assemblies – are examples of such 
cooperation. In addition, regional parliaments and individual members of regional parliaments 
can try to engage in informal contacts, for instance based on party affiliation, hence copying 
the activities of their national colleagues.  
 Of course, the existence of these different options also means that regional parliaments 
have a choice of channels and that different parliaments may opt for different strategies. It is an 
empirical challenge to map the various ways that are exploited by the different regional 
parliaments throughout the EU. In particular, one has always to bear in mind in this respect that 
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the powers of regional parliaments vary across member states (and sometimes even within 
member states) and that the options are therefore not equally attractive or even at the disposal 
to all parliaments. Studies of regional parliamentary scrutiny of EU affairs have indeed found 
substantial variation between parliaments (e.g. Fleischer, 2014, Abels & Eppler, 2015). 
A Research Agenda 
The existing literature on regional parliaments mostly provides us with national perspectives 
on the institutional strength of just one member state’s regional parliaments and their 
networking practices. The aim of our research agenda is to go beyond that. In trying to answer 
the question what roles regional parliaments take up in EU policy-making, we raise three inter-
connected questions.  
 The first of these is about what kind of activities regional parliaments deploy in EU 
politics related to the functions they take up. Are these similar to the ones that they used to 
take up in their domestic context? Or has the emerging European multilevel context forced 
regional assemblies to adapt their strategies? Do they behave different from national 
parliaments? To what extent do they exercise controlling, legislative, and networking functions 
in the European multilevel polity? And in addition, to what extent can regional parliaments 
contribute a distinctive regional voice to EU policy-making (Ladrech, 2015)? 
 Our hypothesis is that the focus of regional parliamentary activities compared to 
national activities will focus less on influencing legislative outcomes, and more on controlling 
the local and regional dimension of EU policies, for example implementation issues. This 
expectation is based on the finding that EU related work of regions (and by extension of regional 
parliaments) involves a higher share of implementation compared to the national level (Reutter, 
2015; Miklin, 2015). As regional elections tend to focus on local or regional issues (except in 
so far as they are not influenced by the satisfaction with national politics),electoral campaigns 
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and constituency work of regional MPs will be sensitive to EU issues only to the extent to which 
they have a regional or local dimension. 
 In addition to the strong implementing role of regional parliaments, certain national 
specificities further weaken their legislative roles. In the case of Germany, for example, Abels 
(2015) argues that the regions allowed their legislative competences to be curtailed in return for 
a stronger role for the Bundesrat. A similar pattern exists in EU affairs, where the Bundesrat 
plays a much stronger role than the regional parliaments. The Bundesrat is, however, a 
representation of regional governments, which means that regional parliaments have lost out in 
the process. In the case of Italy (Nicolini, 2015), but also Austria, there is a tradition, whereby 
the elaboration of laws relies more on intergovernmental cooperation, with regional parliaments 
playing a role in the implementation process. 
  In those countries where the Upper House consists of a regional representation 
(especially Germany and Austria), this constitutional set-up may further lead to a division of 
labour, whereby the Upper House sees itself as the actor responsible for the scrutiny of EU 
legislative proposals (i.e. including a legislative function), whereas regional parliaments focus 
on the control of regional governments. In this issue, Abels (2017) and Högenauer (2017) focus 
on this question – the extent to which regional parliaments focus on controlling their 
government rather than trying to influence legislation – through analyses of how regional 
parliaments use mandates and written questions in an EU context. Randour and Wolfs (2017) 
present an in-depth case study of the activities of the Belgian regional parliaments in the context 
of EU agricultural policy to show that the focus of regional parliaments is indeed on the control 
of the regional executive rather than attempts to influence the legislative process. 
 Finally, the question remains to what extent regional assemblies and their individual 
members embark in contacts with the other players in the European multilevel system. Bursens 
et al. (2015) report that Belgian regional assemblies, despite being constitutionally empowered 
15                                                                    THE JOURNAL OF LEGISLATIVE STUDIES


with a crucial position in domestic politics, invest only sporadically in contacts with other 
regional parliaments or with legislatives or executives from other levels, be they national or 
European. The question of networking is studied by Eppler and Maurer (2017), who analyse 
institutionalized forms of inter-parliamentary cooperation and the extent to which these 
networks fulfil legislative or control functions. 
 A second relevant question is to what extent regional parliaments have been 
empowered by the Lisbon provisions? In this regard, one must distinguish between direct and 
indirect effects. As discussed earlier, the direct impact of the EWS and information policies of 
the EU on the influence of regional parliaments is likely to be relatively small. This has to do 
with the fact that in most cases these new opportunities are being mediated by national 
parliaments and that these powers require a considerable amount of capacity and collective 
action to be effective. 
 In addition, the EWS can also indirectly empower regional parliaments by motivating 
them to revise and inform their internal organization and procedures and to take a more active 
interest in EU politics in general (e.g. Boronska-Hryniewiecka, 2013a). These trends are so far 
best documented at the national level, where the Lisbon Treaty has affected delegation to 
parliamentary administrations (Högenauer & Christiansen, 2015), the organization of 
committee work (Gattermann et al., 2015) and the amount and nature of interparliamentary 
cooperation (Hefftler & Gattermann, 2015). The aim has been to improve the capacity of 
individual parliaments, as well as their ability to react collectively to European policies. It is 
still an open question whether the EWS and other treaty provisions have had similar indirect 
effects on regional assemblies. Did the Lisbon Treaty trigger more interest from regional 
parliaments in EU politics, e.g. regarding the request for information and the tabling of EU files 
in regional parliamentary committees? Boronska-Hryniewiecka (2017) provides both a detailed 
conceptualization of ‘empowerment’ in this context and tests this empirically through several 
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case studies. Buzogány and Häsing (2017) discuss this question in the context of the adaptation 
of the German regional parliaments to the Lisbon Treaty. 
 Finally, regional parliaments are not all equally active or influential, they do not all use 
the same channels to the same extent and they have been empowered by the Lisbon provisions 
in different ways and to a different extent. How can we explain the varying levels of 
empowerment and patterns of activity? If we want to study the multilevel parliamentary system 
in the EU, we need to empirically grasp the activities of regional parliamentary assemblies and 
of their members in this multilevel context. One important issue to keep in mind here is the 
question regarding the level of analysis. Parliamentary behaviour can be examined on an 
aggregate institutional level, i.e. on parliaments as unitary actors, which has been the most used 
perspective, or an individual level, which has hardly been used so far (exceptions are Schneider 
et al.,2014 and Randour and Bursens, 2016). On either level of analysis, we expect substantial 
variation in the different types of activities we outlined in this paper. The challenge will be to 
account for this variation. We distinguish three factors that can influence the mobilization and 
empowerment of regional parliaments.  
 Firstly, we expect that the strength of regional assemblies varies according to the 
constitutional position of the assemblies. For instance, the discussion of the EWS has already 
highlighted the fact that the EWS is implemented in different ways in different countries. Our 
hypothesis is that the strength of regional parliaments in the domestic coordination of the EWS, 
and thus the attractiveness of this channel, depends to a large extent on the constitutional 
position of the region. For example, the Belgian regional parliaments can vote directly in the 
EWS in policy areas that affect their competences (Bursens et al., 2015; Högenauer et al., 2016). 
They are not being ‘consulted’ by the national parliament, but instead their opinions are being 
forwarded verbatim to the EU institutions. In the UK and Spain, by contrast, regional opinions 
are considered to be purely consultative. If the national parliament itself does not adopt a 
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reasoned opinion, regional opinions are usually not forwarded to the EU institutions (Vara 
Arribas, 2015). Secondly, the absence or presence of Euro sceptic parties at the regional level, 
as well as the state of public opinion affects the demand for parliamentary scrutiny of EU 
affairs. Raunio (2009) and Ladrech (2015) argue that the presence of Euro sceptic parties 
backed by a Euro sceptic public generally favour effective scrutiny.  
 In the case of regional parliaments, the Belgian regional parliaments are relatively 
inactive even though they have a stronger constitutional position than other regional 
parliaments. Bursens et al. (2015) generally explain this by the low level of salience of EU 
issues in Belgium. This low political salience is the result of a relatively strong pro-European 
consensus that is not (yet) perturbed by Euro sceptic parties. Thirdly, apart from factors 
influencing the motivation of parliaments to scrutinize EU issues, there are factors that 
influence their capacity to do so. Thus, regional parliaments have generally very limited staff 
resources (Högenauer et al. 2016). The effect of this is that regional parliaments struggle to 
effectively filter problematic legislative proposals from among the roughly 25.000 legislative 
documents that the EU sends out every year. They also have limited expertise in the drafting of 
reasoned opinions while the short deadlines under the EWS further exacerbate these problems. 
In this context, we expect better-staffed parliaments to be more active than those with more 
limited resources. However, there are also ways in which regional parliaments can potentially 
compensate this weakness.  
 In a certain number of cases, regional governments and regional parliaments cooperate 
in the scrutiny of EU proposals. The Viennese parliament, for example, can use the 
administration of the executive to get advice on subsidiarity (Miklin, 2015). Similarly, various 
German Länder governments and the Scottish executive advice their parliaments on subsidiarity 
(Högenauer et al. 2016; Vara Arribas, 2015). By contrast, the extent of executive-legislative 
cooperation in Spain is limited (Castellà Andreu & Kölling, 2015). There is thus further need 
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to examine domestic traditions of cooperation between different actors. Finally, different 
regional parliaments show different levels of interest in cooperation with other parliaments. 
One possible factor may once again be the dual or cooperative federalist logic underpinning the 
set-up of the member state. Thus, cooperation between regional parliaments seems to be 
relatively low in the UK, Belgium and Spain (Bursens et al. 2015; Högenauer et al. 2016; 
Castellà Andreau & Kölling, 2015). Boronska-Hryniewiecka (2017) uses case studies to both 
illustrate the different degrees to which the EWS has empowered regional parliaments, and 
explain what causes this variation. Abels (2017) discusses how the adaptation to the Treaty of 
Lisbon and the introduction of the EWS have inspired some regional parliaments to try and 
obtain mandating powers. She further analyses to what extent these attempts have been 
successful and which factors can explain the differences between regions. 
Conclusion 
European integration has created a multilevel political system comprising European, national 
and regional levels. The resulting governance system has been far more elaborated on the side 
of the executive than on the side of the legislative. We argued that this unequal development 
has brought legitimacy issues for the EU. As representation is key to democratic legitimacy, 
scholars have engaged in studying the role of national and European parliamentary assemblies. 
The conclusion so far is that national parliaments are gradually learning to play the multilevel 
game and are slowly gaining more formal and informal powers to control national and European 
executives. Because a growing number of member states is characterized by increasingly 
relevant regional authorities, the issue of parliamentary representation in the EU, this volume 
expands to the regional level. Data on regional parliaments’ involvement in EU affairs is still 
very scarce and often anecdotal. 
  The contributions in this issue help to provide a more comprehensive mapping of the 
activities of regional parliaments and of their individual members. They also add to better 
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theoretically understand the role of regional parliaments in EU legislative and executive policy-
making. They moreover examine the way regional parliaments scrutinize EU policies directly 
at the European level and indirectly at the domestic level by holding regional and national 
governments accountable during domestic EU policy coordination. Finally, they study the 
formal and informal information and communication networks regional parliaments build with 
other legislatives and executives at the different levels of the EU polity. In other words, they 
make a start analysing a series of analytical and explanatory questions regarding the exact role 
of regional parliaments and their strength in their domestic environment. The main challenge 
ahead of us lies in further developing theory-embedded hypotheses to explain variation between 
regional parliamentary involvement in the multilevel parliamentary system of the EU and to 
empirically study these in a systematic comparative way. 
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